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P E R S P E C T I V E

STRONG CRITICISM
OF THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF TRIAL BY JURY

exalted the power of the jury and diminished the power of the court. Legislatures
have seemed to resent any intervention
by the judge in the trial of a criminal case
beyond a very colorless and abstract
statement of the law to be applied to the
case. So jealous have legislatures become
I GAIEVE FOR R4Y COUIVTRY LO say that
of the influence of the court upon the
the administration of the criminal law in
j u ~ ythat it is now an error of law for the
all the states in he Union (there may be
court to express his opinion upon the
one or two exceptions) is a disgrace to
facts, although he leaves the ultimate
our civilization.
decision, of course, to the jury. The
What makes the difference between
opportunity which this gives defense
the administration of the criminal law in
counsel to pervert the law, and the wide
England and in this country? In the first
scope which the system in restricting the
piace, the English judges have retained
judge gives to the jury of following its
the complete control o\7er the method by
own sweet will, of course, doubles the
which counsel try the case, restraining
opportunity for miscarriages of justice.
them to the points at issue and preventThe function of the judge is limited to
ing them from diverting the minds of the
that of the moderator in a religious
jury to inconsequential and irrelevant
assembly.
circumstances and considerations.
The counsel for the defense, relymg on
Second, the English judges have reserved
the diminished power of the court,
the power to aid the jury by advising
creates, by dramatic art and by harping
them how to consider the evidence and
on the importance of unimportant
expressing an opinion upon it. In this
details, a false atmosphere in the courtway the sophistical rhetoric and sentiroom which the judge is powerless to
mental appeals of counsel are made to
dispel, and under the hjrpnotic influence
lose their misleading effect, and the
of which the counsel is able to lead the
jurors are brought to a sense of their
jurors to vote as jurors for a verdict
responsibility in deciding the actual
which, after all the excitement of the trial
issues of fact as to the guilt or innocence
has passed away, they are unable to
of the defendant upon the evidence
support as men and women.
before them.
Another problem is the difficulty of
The institution of trial by jury has
securing jurors properly sensible of the
come to be regarded as such a fetish in
duty which they are summoned to
our country that state legislatures have
perform. I11 the extreme tenderness the
state legislatures exhibit toward persons
So jealous have legislatures accused as criminals, and especially as
become of the influence of the murderers, thej7 allow peremptory
court upon the jury that it is now challenges to the defendant far in excess
an error of law for the court to of those allowed to the state. This very
great discrepancy between the t ~ 7 0sides
express his opinion upon the facts, of the case allows defense counsel to
although he leaves the ultimate elimina~efrom all panels every person of
decision, of course, to the jury. force and character and standing in the
communiLj~,and to assemble a collection
in the j u ~ ybox of nondescripts of no
character, weak and amenable to every
breeze ol emotion, however maudlin or
irrelevant to the issue.

If the power of the court by statute to
advise the jury to comment and express
its opinion to the jury upon the facts in
every criminal case could be restored,
and if the state and the defendant were
deprived of peremptory challenges in the
selection of a jury, 25 percent oi those
trials which are now miscarriages of
justice would result in the conviction of
the guilty defendant, and that which has
become a mere game in which the
defendant's counsel play with loaded
dice, would resume its office of a serious
judicial investigation into the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.
Some people may consider the
preceding remarks a gross os~erreaction
to the "not guilty" verdict in the 0.J.
Simpson case. Others may think these
remarks are right on the money. In any
event, they were made long before
defense lawyers had the assistance of any
experts in selecting a jury and long before
anybody accused defense lahvyers of
"playlng the race card."
Every word of attack on the American
system of criminal justice and trial by
jury, in particular, that appears in this
piece, was uttered in a commencement
address at the Yale Law School on June
26, 1905. (I have only substituted "men
and women" for "men.")The speaker on
that occasion some 90 years ago was a
lawyer who had already acquired considerable stature - and was to achieve a
good deal more. His name was William
Howard Taft, a future President and a
future Chief Justice of the United States.
(Tlzefiill text of Taft's I-enznrlrs appealin vol~inze15 of the Yale Law Joumal at
pp. 1-1 7.)

This piece also appeared ul the Los Angeles
Daily Joumal and thc Detroit Ne\vs,
Oct. 16, 1995. Yale Kanzisar is the Clnl-ence Dn1.i-ow
Distit~guishcdUlziversity Projcssol. ojLa1v.

